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The Influence of Teacher Unionization on
Educational Outcomes: A Summarization
of the Research, Popular Methodologies,
and Gaps in the Literature
Sarah Guthery
Texas A&M Commerce
Abstract
This paper summarizes the research on the relationship between teacher
unionization and educational outcomes at the state, district, school, and individual (student) levels. Although teachers are the largest organized professionals in the United States, much of educational policy literature has ignored
unionization as a subject of study. An emerging consensus from the literature
believes that collective bargaining raises teacher pay, increases district expenditure and reduces class size; however, union influence on student outcomes
has not yet been established. The literature is unclear as to whether or not
teacher unionization is associated with student graduation rates or standardized test scores.
Keywords: teachers union, teacher unionization, educational outcomes
Educational policy research
often utilizes data sets that span
multiple states to study policy effects
on teacher pay, student dropout
rates, and student achievement. One
variable of interest that is frequently
overlooked in a multi-state study is
the presence of a teacher union. The
size, strength, and legal standing of
a teacher’s union produce unique
working conditions in the district
where the union operates. Multistate
studies that omit a unionization

variable fail to control for preexisting state conditions when trying to
isolate policy outcomes. This paper
summarizes the research on the
relationship between teacher unionization and educational outcomes at
the state, district, school, and individual (student) levels. The following
research questions are addressed:
•

How does the extent of unionization influence outcomes,
such as teacher pay and student
achievement?
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•

What are the primary methodological and analytical traditions
found in the published literature
on the effects of unionization on
various educational outcomes?

•

What are the principal theoretical
and conceptual traditions utilized
in present efforts to understand
the relationship?

•

What are the current gaps in our
understanding of the relationship
between teacher unionization
and educational outcomes and
performance?

Teacher unionization has
changed over time and is difficult to
define. This paper first establishes
what a “unionized” state is and how
that is defined. Next, the popular
theoretical and methodological traditions in union research are covered. Then, this paper summarizes
key studies that link unionization to
educational outcomes. Last, gaps in
the literature are identified as well as
possible future directions in research.
Although teacher unions are often
discussed in the educational policy
realm, the academic literature has
largely ignored unionization as a subject of study (Kleiner, 1990; Lott &
Kenny, 2013). This literature review
examines the evidence linking teacher unions to educational outcomes
as well as identifies areas yet to be
explored.
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Background on Teachers’ Unions
The landscape of teachers’
unions that is seen today is the result
of decades of ever-evolving power
sharing between states, districts, and
teachers. In 1963, 93% of the school
districts in the US had active teacher
organizations, but only 1% had a
collective bargaining contract with
its teachers (Hoxby, 1996). In contrast, the 1960s through the 1980s
was a period of rapid growth for the
collective bargaining power of teachers’ unions (Hoxby, 1996). As states
began allowing, and even requiring,
collective bargaining, the number of
teachers who worked under a contract that resulted from collective
bargaining had increased to 36% by
1993. Hoxby found that the 1980s
were a period of rapid change and
expansion for unions; however, the
unionization changes had stabilized
by 1990.
While most of the education
policy and funding decisions are
made on the state and district level,
there are two significant national
teachers’ unions in the United States,
the American Federation of Teachers
(AFT) and the National Educational
Association (NEA) (Coulson, 2010;
Duplantis, Chandler, & Geske, 1995;
Steelman, Powell, & Carini, 2000).
Both the AFT and the NEA are
over one hundred years old, employ
national lobbyists, and have members
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in all 50 states. There are approximately 3.5 million teachers in the
United States, making teaching the
largest unionized profession (Kleiner,
2000).
Unionization Across the States
Broadly, a teachers’ union
is defined as a voting organization
formed to represent teachers collectively. Each state varies on the degree
to which unionization is allowed,
presenting a challenge as to whether
or not a state is truly “unionized.”
The unions have a unique legal
standing in each state, and the extent
to which a union can influence a
particular issue can vary significantly
across states. Several authors have
divided the broad label of ‘unionized’ into multiple categories of
influence in order to avoid the dichotomous assignment of unionized
or non-unionized. There are three
levels of unionized states: mandatory
bargaining states, union permissive
states, and ‘right to work’ states (Duplantis et al., 1995; Lindy, 2011).
According to an analysis by
the National Council on Teacher
Quality, the majority of states fall
into the strictest category of protection for labor bargaining. Thirty
states require that their districts
collectively bargain with teachers and
possess a state statute, which explicitly protects that right. Fifteen states
allow individual districts to decide

whether or not they will collectively bargain with the teacher unions.
Should they decide to bargain, these
states have statutes that do not mandate that they reach an agreement
with the unions. Texas, Georgia,
South Carolina, North Carolina and
Virginia are the five states in which
collective bargaining is explicitly prohibited by statute in the state constitution (National Council on Teacher
Quality, n.d.).
Within the states that allow
or require bargaining, there are labor
topics that are explicitly provided for
or outlawed by state statute during
collective bargaining. For example,
in Indiana, districts are required to
collectively bargain for wages, but
teachers’ hours are a prohibited item
of bargaining (National Council on
Teacher Quality, n.d.). Comparisons
across states are difficult because
union influence is not equally expressed over the full range of bargaining issues, like hours, pay, class
size or teacher tenure. In order to
more precisely rank the influence
of unions in each state, many researchers have attempted to define
unionization in a variety of ways.
While the presence or absence of a
union contract is easy to measure, no
consensus on the best way to count
unionization exists.
Union Models
The way researchers ap-

Influence of Teacher Unionization

proach union models can be contextualized in three important ways.
The first way is to identify popular
theoretical traditions in the union
literature. The theoretical traditions
are the ideological underpinnings
of the study. The second approach
is to evaluate the methodological
traditions that a study draws on to
analyze the data in the studies. The
third method is to analyze how the
author decides to count unionization.
The decisions authors make in these
three areas are critical to the framing
and findings of the studies. After a
discussion of relevant studies on the
topic, the most influential methodological and theoretical traditions are
summarized.
Theoretical Traditions
There are several common
theoretical frameworks underlying
many models in the teacher union
literature: rent-seeking behavior,
appealing to the median voter model,
and Tiebout sorting. The premise
of rent-seeking is that an organization will act in its own best interest
(Krueger, 1974). When an author
questions whether unions benefit
themselves or the students, the theoretical underpinning for the model
is rent-seeking. If a union is found
to be rent-seeking, it would pursue higher pay, smaller classes, and
strong tenure with no corresponding
increase in quality. In rent-seeking
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unions, teacher conditions would improve; however, the students would
not be better off, leading to the conclusion the policies were pursued out
of self-interest. Union studies that
question if the changes are beneficial
for the students or the teachers are
usually testing this theory. Rose and
Stonstelie (2010) and Lindy (2011)
utilized a rent-seeking framework as
the premise of their papers, as they
investigated teacher unions.
The median voter model
states that a voting organization
will appeal to the median of their
population to maintain a majority
of votes. Winters (2011) built upon
this theoretical model to explain the
union’s defense of advanced degrees
and teacher tenure. The union, in
this case, is appealing to their median
voter, or the average teacher. In an
effort to appease the median voter,
the voting organization will pursue
policies that will be popular with the
typical voter.
Finally, the Tiebout sorting
theory suggests that people “vote
with their feet,” and if people are
unhappy with their district, they will
move. Thus, the deserted district will
be forced to compete and improve
quality to win people back, or the
district offering the more desirable
education will attract more people.
Lovenheim (2009) used this theory
to study outcomes of unionization.
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Methodological Traditions
When examining the effect
of unions, several popular methodological traditions are discussed
in the union literature—difference-in-difference or the statistically
similar panel data with fixed effects
(Hoxby, 1996; Lovenheim, 2009).
Difference-in-difference captures
existing differences and subtracts
them from the beginning and end
time points to neutralize a difference
that may exist from the outset. Panel
data with fixed effects is very similar,
but difference-in-difference has two
groups compared at two points in
time. Panel data with fixed effects
allows multiple groups at multiple
points in time to be analyzed (Lindy, 2011). Generalized Method of
Moments (GMM) is a regression
where certain variables can be frozen
and treated as a constant and, thus,
factored out while maintaining the
consistency and asymptotically
normal properties of the estimator
(Winters, 2011). Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) is also frequently used
as well as regression with Instrumental Variables (Duplantis et al., 1995;
Lott & Kenny, 2013; Moe, 2009;
Rose & Stonstelie, 2010; Steelman et
al., 2000).
Methods for Calculating
Unionization
Since no consensus in the
field is currently established on the

meaning of ‘unionized’, several
different ways are used to determine
if a state is unionized. In a seminal
paper, Hoxby (1996) used a dummy
variable for union presence in a state.
Other researchers have since tried
to quantify the strength of union
presence on a variety of dimensions.
Methods for obtaining a continuous rather than discrete measure of
union strength include: a measure
of financial power (Lott & Kenny,
2013), the percentage of a district or
state that is a member (Duplantis et
al., 1995; Steelman et al., 2000; Winters, 2011), the percentage of voters in union elections (Lovenheim,
2009), union friendly laws (Hoxby
& Leigh, 2004), and a composite
of multiple dimensions of influence (Moe, 2009; Rose & Stonstelie,
2010). States that appear strong on
one metric may be weak on another,
making an overall measure hard to
obtain. From the literature, common
metric that is widely accepted as a
measure of union power has yet to
be developed.
There are two other considerations that must be addressed
when constructing a union model.
The first issue is how to handle the
data from Hawaii, as the whole state
is one district with a strong union,
resulting in a bilateral monopoly
that does not exist in any other state
(Winker, Scull, & Zeehandelaar,
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2012). The second concern is properly controlling for the demographic
difference in the South and the lack
of teacher unions throughout that
region. Even after controlling for demographics (race, percentage taking
the test, parent education, and poverty), the South is still a statistically
significant predictor of SAT scores
(Steelman et al., 2000).
Union Presence and Student
Outcomes
Several authors have attempted to quantify union influence on
popular outcome metrics for student and school performance. Some
authors have measured teacher union
influence on student level outcomes,
such as student graduation rates and
student achievement., ther authors
have focused on the district and
school level outcome variables, like
class size and district expenditure.
The following section examines the
evidence available on how a union
affects its associated districts and
students.
District Outcome: Expenditure
and Class Size
A popular question in union
research centers on if district expenditure is influenced in the presence
of unions (Duplantis et al., 1995;
Hoxby, 1996; Lovenheim, 2009;
Winters, 2011). Class size has also
been included as a proxy measure
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for district expenditure because of
the cost of increased staffing (Rose
& Stonstelie 2010). In a seminal
paper, Hoxby (1996) examined why
school production functions were
positive before 1960, and increasing expenditure has had little to no
effect thereafter on school achievement. This discovery means teachers
could be modeled in an equation
to show positive achievement gains
for every dollar spent on a teacher’s
salary. Hoxby tested the hypothesis
that unions could be one factor for
the increasing, yet nonproductive,
allocation of resources in schools
by analyzing panel data from 10,509
districts, the National Bureau of
Economic Research (NBER) and the
Public Sector Collective Bargaining
dataset, using difference-indifference.
The most significant contribution of
this study was the size, methodology
and detail. The measure for school
achievement was the high school
dropout rate (16–19 not in school
and no degree). A dummy variable
was used for unionization in the time
period a district unionized. A district was coded ‘unionized’ if at least
50% of the teachers were members
and the district teaching contract
was a result of collective bargaining.
The study showed that the presence
of unions increases the amount of
district per pupil spending by 3%.
Then, Hoxby (1996) used a passage
of statewide laws as an Instrumental
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Variable (IV), or proxy for unionization. Reanalyzing the data using
difference-in-difference on the data
with IVs, Hoxby (1996) found that
per pupil expenditure increased by
12.3%, fortifying the original conclusion that per pupil spending increases are linked to unionization, even
more than previous research had
shown.
Duplantis et al. (1995) conducted a cross-sectional study on 11
states without collective bargaining
provisions to determine the difference in teacher pay between union
and nonunion districts. This analysis
yielded corroborating results to the
aforementioned studies. Analyzing only districts with over 10,000
students in 11 states using Ordinary
Least Squares (OLS), the authors
found that having a collective bargaining agreement in place is associated with a 15.5% increase in district
spending (Duplantis, et al., 1995).
In response to studies showing unions increased district spending, Lovenheim (2009) cited Hoxby
(1996) as a basis for research; but,
where Hoxby coded unionization
as a dummy variable, Lovenheim,
instead, measured union strength
by paper ballots cast in union elections with an interaction of length
of unionization. Hypothesizing that
unions have no impact on teacher
pay or per student district expendi-

tures, the outcome variable of high
school dropouts was used (as Hoxby
did) as a proxy for district achievement;however, the rate was slightly
altered to include 14- to 18-year-olds.
Lovenheim (2009) hand collected
paper ballots cast for union leaders
in Iowa, Minnesota and Indiana.
This method was believed to be
a more effective proxy for union
strength because it captured active
union activity in a district, thus the
likelihood that the union influenced
policy (Lovenheim, 2009). Using
nonparametric regression on the
original Hoxby question, the result
was that unions are correlated with
increased spending but do not have
a statistically significant impact on
per-student district expenditures
given the strength or length of union
presence (Lovenheim, 2009). As
union participation increased, district
spending also tended to increase. As
the district spent more money on
their students, neighboring students
began to enter the district because of
the Tiebout effect and increased the
enrollment, which reduced the per
pupil expenditure ratio (Lovenheim,
2009).
In a natural experiment in
New Mexico, Lindy (2011) found
that the presence of unions has no
effect on the per pupil expenditure.
Lindy exploited a natural experiment
(where there is a naturally occurring,
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non-experimental disruption to the
variable of interest, which provides
the researcher the opportunity to
study the effect of the change with
the same population) to examine
unions before and after the legalization of unions in New Mexico. The
result is in line with previous findings
that unions do not appear to change
per pupil expenditure.
Confirming the majority of
findings, Rose & Stonstelie (2010)
found that unions do decrease class
size. By randomly sampling 771 out
of 982 districts in California during
the 1999-2000 school year and using
OLS (with and without IV) and 2
Stage-Least-Squares, the authors
found that, when controlling for
demographics, larger unions yielded
smaller class sizes with a lower ratio
of pupils to teachers. The average
class size is expected to be 1.2 students less in a large district compared
to an average sized district (Rose &
Stonstelie, 2010). The authors attribute this difference to the strength
of the union in the larger district.
District Outcome: Teacher Pay
A growing body of evidence
supports the hypothesis that the
presence of a union increases teacher
pay (Duplantis, et al., 1995; Hoxby,
1996; Rose & Stonstelie, 2010). Duplantis et al. (1995) found teachers
working under a collective bargaining
agreement earned 9.5% more than
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their counterparts in districts without
one. Hoxby (1996) found that teachers who unionize get an increase of
three to five percent in the time period for which they are unionizing, and
this increase has a lagged effect of
increasing pay compared to districts
that unionize later, or never do.
Contrary to the previous
findings, Lovenheim (2009) found
that the strength of a union does not
alter teacher pay, which is interesting because one of the top reasons
teachers give for being in a union is
to raise pay. Lovenheim (2009) also
concluded that teachers’ salaries were
not found to increase in the long or
short run due to unionization.
Winters (2011) examined the
salary of experienced and inexperienced teachers based on the median
voter model. Using this model, the
author was interested in how union
and nonunion districts prioritized
the teacher pay scale. According to
Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS),
the average teacher has fifteen years
experience and an advanced degree.
The median voter model theorizes that unions would appeal to the
median of their membership thus
likely to favor policies that benefit
the majority of members, in this
case, experienced teachers. Linking
three datasets (SASS, School District
Demographic system and the Bureau of Labor Statistics) from 4,237
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districts in the forty-eight contiguous
states, union activity was measured
by the legal status of collective
bargaining and membership density;
the data was analyzed with Generalized Method of Moments (GMM).
The author found that, in districts
with weak unions, the pay structure
favors new hires (Winters, 2011). In
districts with a strong union, the pay
structure favors experience and advanced degrees. Controlling for the
strength of the union and spillover
effects from neighboring districts,
teachers with experience earned up
to 18–28% more than inexperienced
teachers (Winters, 2011).
Student Outcome: High School
Dropout Rate
Union presence is correlated
with an increased number of high
school dropouts; thus, when used
as a proxy for school effectiveness,
teacher unions appear to have a negative impact on student persistence
(Hoxby, 1996; Lindy, 2011, Steelman, et al., 2000). Lovenheim (2009)
found that there was a small decrease
in high school graduation rates in the
short run but no statistically significant effect of unions on dropouts
in the long run. When comparing
the means of districts that unionize
with those that never do, Lovenheim
(2009) found that non-unionized
districts tend to be smaller and more
rural with a higher poverty rate and

fewer high school dropouts. The
finding that union presence is more
likely in an area with more high
school dropouts indicates that, if
unionization is used as a predictor
for the dropout rate, endogeneity
in the equation. Whatever triggers
unionization within a population,
something else simultaneously
occurs,increasing the high school
dropout rate. Therefore, studies that
do not disentangle the simultaneous
occurrence of the high school dropout rate and union presence will likely find that union presence decreases
student persistence in high school.
Student Outcome: Achievement
on Standardized Tests
A consensus has not been
reached within the literature about
the impact of unions on student
achievement, in large, because of
the variety of ways that unionization
and achievement are defined. Several studies have tested for a possible
relationship between union presence
and student achievement.
Lott & Kenny (2013) authored a study of large districts (at
least 10,000 students) in forty-two
states. They operationalized union
presence by monetary union dues.
The authors regressed the dollar
amount of union dues on reading
and math scores in fourth grade.
They found that students in states
with the highest union dues (union
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dues divided over the number of
teachers and the number of students) had the lowest fourth grade
test scores.
Two studies (Moe, 2009;
Rose & Stonstelie, 2010) used the
California Academic Performance
Index (API) as a proxy for achievement. The API is a rating given to
a California school on a scale of
200–1000. This number is a compilation score for yearly test achievement
and test score growth. A measure
is also reported for how well subpopulations are achieving within
the school. Using the sum of the
API outcome over four years, when
teacher contracts were coded (using
factor analysis), the more restrictive
a teacher contract is to the district,
the lower the API (Moe, 2009). In
another study that measured union
strength by size in California, the
API scores in large districts with
active unions were 3% lower than the
average district score (Rose & Sonstelie, 2010).
Carini (2008) used data from
the National Educational Longitudinal Study (NELS) from 1988 and
1990 to analyze test scores from
10,799 students. Prior knowledge
was controlled for using the eighth
grade test score, and the outcome
measure was the history, reading,
math and science standardized tenth
grade test. Using OLS, Carini deter-
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mined that in the first model, unions
were associated with higher test
scores; however, when further iterations of the models were run and all
the controls were added, the effect
size became insignificant.
When SAT and ACT scores
are used as the proxy for achievement, unions do appear to positively influence scores. Lindy (2011)
examined what happened when legal
collective bargaining was prohibited
and then reinstated in New Mexico.
In 1999, the policy sunset on Collective Bargaining Rights; then, the
subsequent 2003 Reauthorization of
Collective Bargaining Rights provided a natural experiment to test
the effect of unions on achievement
longitudinally. Lindy (2011) analyzed
panel data with fixed effects and
found that the SAT scores of New
Mexico students rose after the reinstatement of collective bargaining.
Similarly, Steelman et al.
(2000) found that when controlling
for demographics in the south, the
SAT and ACT scores were raised in
the presence of a higher percentage
of teachers and staff in unions. This
finding was key because the South
has unique regional characteristics
that can be overrepresented in the
nonunion sample, as the South is the
only region where unions are illegal.
K–12 achievement tests
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can be difficult to compare across
states because of the variation in
standards and testing. In an attempt
to work around this bias, SAT and
ACT scores are used for proxies of
achievement (Steelman, et al., 2000;
Lindy, 2011); however, the state
participation rate of eligible students
on the SAT and ACT is a strong
predictor of test scores (Powell &
Steelman, 1996). If a state recruits
more minorities and low socioeconomic status test takers in K–12,
then, more likely, the scores will be
lower because the percentage of
wealthy, white college bound students taking the test will be lower
(Powell & Steelman, 1996). Measuring unionization effects on student
achievement with the SAT and ACT
as a proxy for student achievement
has the added problem of unionization being correlated with states that
have a slightly higher dropout rate
(Hoxby, 1996; Lindy, 2011, Steelman,
et al., 2000, Lovenheim, 2009). As a
result, one would expect that, when
measuring the influence of unionization with SAT and ACT scores, a
strong sorting effect has taken place
in those states prior to the exam.
Further complicating matters,
the level at which student achievement is operationalized has an
impact on the outcome of the study.
Carini (2008) concluded that studies
where the data is highly aggregated

to calculate student achievement are
more likely to find negative effects
of unionization than studies that use
student level data.
Gaps in the Literature and Future
Directions
Many studies have established a relationship between unionization and a variety of educational
outcomes. Given that a variety of
authors have found that unionization
does have an impact on a multitude
of educational outcomes, adding
unionization as a control variable in
future studies may improve policy
models. Unfortunately, defining
unionization is difficult, as the degree
to which a state is unionized varies
by district. Two studies propose a
new method of calculating union
strength for future research.
First, a joint study from the
Fordham Institute and Education
Reform Now ranks the 50 states
across multiple dimensions of union
strength (Winker, et al., 2012). This
detailed 400-page analysis ranks the
states by 37 variables across five
dimensions of union influence. The
authors findings generally support
the division of states by the three
bands of bargaining with the notable
exception of North Carolina, which
was ranked in the fourth, not the
bottom fifth, tier even though collective bargaining is illegal in those
districts (Winker et al., 2012). This
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report is one of the most extensive attempts to rank union power
across states; however, the rankings
have yet to be used by a researcher
as the definition of union influence
in a research study. This preexisting
measure would be interesting to test
for union influence on educational outcomes, considering there are
measures in multiple domains as well
as an overall score for the state.
The second study used California district data to analyze union
strength using district contracts
(Strunk & Reardon, 2010). The authors applied test theory to contract
items in districts to come up with
a reliable score for union strength.
This Partial Independence Item
Response model looks at how rare an
item is in district contracts and, then,
ranks the items from least to most
restrictive based on how rarely each
appears in district contracts. Their
latent trait model produced a ranking
of 39 bargaining items in California
teacher contracts that could be another useful preexisting measure for
future research.
Further research is needed
to develop more nuanced measures
of teacher unionization. Because no
consensus exists in the literature on
how to measure union presence in a
state, assessing preexisting measures
of union strength is difficult. The
effect of teacher unions on school
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outcomes is largely dependent upon
the definition of unionization and
the outcome measure selected; however, the future direction in the field
is toward multiple measures of union
strength.
Conclusion
Teacher unionization is a critical component of education policy
in almost every state. The conclusion
from the literature is that a relationship between teacher unionization
and educational outcomes is evident
at the various levels of education.
Further, large-scale policy analyses that do not account for teacher
unionization may be attributing
differential policy effects to causes
other than unionization. Theoretical models that control for teacher
union strength are likely closer to
accounting for the true policy climate
in each state.
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